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Shaking Up the 2019 European Election:  
Macron, Salvini, Orbán, and 
the Fate of the European Party System
by Julie Hamann, Milan Nič, and Jana Puglierin 
More fragmented than ever, Europe is at a crossroads, making the 2019 European 
Parliament election an immensely political event. Stakes are high for Emmanuel 
Macron, Matteo Salvini and Viktor Orbán, all of whom could shake up the balance 
of power in the EP. Macron has lost much of his initial vigor, and the disruptive po-
tential of Salvini and Orbán is significant. If played well, their combined power could 
send shock waves across all European institutions.
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Despite fundamental political differences, French Presi-
dent Emmanuel Macron, Italian Deputy Prime Minister 
Matteo Salvini and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Or-
bán have three things in common: They all understood 
early on that the European Parliamentary election on 
23-26 May 2019 could present a watershed moment in Eu-
ropean history. Equally, every one of them has publicly 
emerged as a chief protagonist in a polarized “battle of 
narratives” focused on the polls. Most consequentially, 
all three of them are perceived to have the potential to 
shake up their respective political families and, with 
them, the balance of power in the European Parliament 
(EP): Macron among liberals, Orbán among conserva-
tives, and Salvini among parties of the far right. 
Just as he had managed during the 2017 French presi-
dential election, Emmanuel Macron has been attempting 
to overcome the left-right divide on a European scale. By 
creating a movement beyond party structures from the 
center, La République En Marche (LREM) is seeking to 
end the dominance of the two camps – the European 
People’s Party (EPP) and the Party of European Socialists 
(PES) – which Macron judges inept for directing the EU in 
the future. Matteo Salvini’s declared mission is to unite 
the fractured right-wing euroskeptic camp behind himself 
as a leading figure. He also aspires to create a Nationalist 
International in the EP, which could then have sufficient 
power to re-shape the nature of European integration. 
Meanwhile, Viktor Orbán’s strategy seems to consist 
of the following: Keeping his options open, remaining 
within the EPP for the moment and, importantly, creating 
an informal coalition across party lines with other nation-
alists to block new EU legislations which would go against 
illiberal governments or limit the power of nation-states.
Unlike other players who also claim to reshape the next 
European Parliament, such as the Greens or left-wing 
parties, Macron, Salvini and Orbán are heads of state 
and government (or an informal head, as in the case of 
Salvini). Therefore, they are seen as the key players in the 
fundamental realignment of the European party system 
following the EP election. 
However, a deeper look into recent developments 
shows that Emmanuel Macron has, so far, failed to get 
on board his own population and his European partners 
in his mission to revolutionize the European Parliament. 
His potential to revamp the European elections in the 
same way he did the French presidential election is very 
slim. His attempt of framing the European elections as a 
battle between pro- and anti-European forces – between 
“progressives and nationalists” – appears to have back-
fired: For the most part, it has played into the hands of the 
camps led by Salvini and Orbán.
Although previous attempts by populist right-wing 
parties to form a euroskeptic alliance in the European 
Parliament have not been very successful, one should 
not underestimate Salvini’s dedication, systematic ap-
proach and political strength. At the very least, he could 
join forces with Orbán to create a loose union of strong 
nation-states to provide a more favorable environment for 
countries weary of the EU allegedly “dictating” their val-
ues and rules. Even if the overall balance of power in the 
EP remains tilted toward pro-European forces, enhanced 
influence and coordination among anti-EU populist MEPs 
will have serious implications for the interaction among 
EU institutions. In this sense, Salvini and Orbán appear to 
be the key players in the fundamental realignment of the 
European party system on the political right.
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Emmanuel Macron: The Struggling Visionary
Emmanuel Macron’s plan for Europe did not quite work 
out the way he had hoped: Partners, notably Germany, 
took rather small steps toward compromises on EU re-
forms, and only after a long time. In France, growing un-
rest and protest risk paralyzing the president. It appears 
that Macron’s promise to offer a counter-narrative against 
populism is backfiring and further deepening the divi-
sions between pro- and anti-Europeans; that is, between 
those at ease with a globalized France and those who 
feel left behind. These gaps will likely become even more 
conspicuous during the European election. 
Macron set the tone of his European campaign in 
August 2018 and declared the elections as a vote between 
“progressives” and “nationalists”.1 In light of the slumping 
popularity Macron is witnessing amid the yellow vests 
movement and beyond, his strategy is clearly past its 
prime. Social justice is the utmost concern for the major-
ity of French people, and they will judge the campaign 
by LREM’s capacity to put this topic at the top of their 
European agenda. Any kind of polarization risks fueling 
the right and left wing’s intention to make the elections a 
“referendum” against Macron.  
The Strategy of Confronting Ideologies
Ever since 2016, when Emmanuel Macron set out his ideas 
for reforming the EU at the beginning of his presidential 
campaign, pro-Europeans all over the continent ac-
claimed him as a European visionary: After years, when 
political leaders seemed trapped in the minutiae of every-
day crisis management, Macron offered an impassioned 
plea for the EU. Evoking symbols of European identity, he 
argued with a mixture of emotiveness and concrete pro-
posals, such as a eurozone budget, a common European 
asylum office, better defense cooperation, or massive 
investment in digitalization and artificial intelligence. By 
linking the promises of far-reaching economic and social 
reforms in France with the ambition to advance renewal 
at European level, he placed himself at the forefront of 
the European debate, before he became increasingly 
absorbed by internal turmoil since November 2018. Defy-
ing the nationalist trend, he is defending the necessity of 
further European integration as part of the core national 
interest of every European state. His victory against 
Marine Le Pen, the candidate of the far right, was hence 
interpreted as a victory of Europeans against nationalists. 
Based on this narrative, Macron chose an approach 
of confrontation as Orbán and Salvini had done earlier. 
Presented as antidotes to an open Europe, they feature as 
the only two politicians in an official video clip published 
by the French government to encourage citizens to vote in 
May 2019.2 Macron’s strategy is based on two assumptions: 
First, continuing the course of his presidential campaign, 
he is seeking to rally important parts of the electorate 
against his main adversary, the president of the extreme-
right Rassemblement National (RN), Marine Le Pen. Sec-
ond, he envisages his movement LREM to head an alliance 
strong enough to dismantle the existing grand coalition 
system in the European Parliament. Acting in concert 
with other like-minded centrist parties, such as Spain’s 
Ciudadanos and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats 
for Europe (ALDE), would effectively make him the king-
maker of the new President of the European Commission, 
and allow him to decisively shape European politics. 
An Uneasy Liberal Alliance
Although LREM and the EP’s ALDE agreed to create a 
common platform for the election campaign, Macron 
has retained the option to create his own political group 
in the Parliament after the elections. However, both 
options bear difficulties for LREM and Macron: Neither 
the European Liberals nor the voters seem enthusiastic 
about a strong alliance between ALDE and LREM today. 
First, the political group is itself divided and the coher-
ence with Macron’s EU program not evident despite the 
outspoken support of ALDE’s leader Guy Verhofstadt. The 
French president’s plans for an independent eurozone 
budget are particularly contested among some liberals, 
not least among members of Germany’s Free Democratic 
Party – notwithstanding party leader Christian Lindner’s 
efforts to dispel doubts.3 Moreover, Macron’s concessions 
to the yellow vests movement add new elements of dis-
sent: The announced social measures such as the increase 
of the minimum wage are estimated to cost around 10 
billion euros and to push the French deficit over the three-
percent limit. Second, as adversaries often criticize him 
for alleged neoliberalism, Macron’s liberal label is a major 
stumbling block in resolving his government’s crisis. 
French voters – who are traditionally skeptical about the 
notion of liberalism – were quick to notice how the presi-
 . Position: President of France
 . Age: 41
 . Country population: 67 million 
 . Party affiliation at the EP, possible no. of MEPs: 
Cooperation with ALDE  
(ca. 16-20 out of ca. 92-114)18
 . Declared ambition:  
Become a king-maker in EU centrist majority
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dent’s social turn and his warnings of ultraliberalism in 
Europe stood in contradiction to his alliance with ALDE.4 
Furthermore, as the French voters are now expecting 
concrete action rather than abstract concepts, the alleged 
division between nationalists and progressives will not 
hold as a leitmotiv for the upcoming elections. Macron 
already departed from this approach and stopped evoking 
it publicly. However, he needs a strong result in the elec-
tions to allow him to stand  in a group of his own and to 
convince other parliamentarians to join him.
Macron’s approach is also creating tension with regard 
to Germany: Several times, he implicitly attacked Angela 
Merkel’s CDU for sharing the same political group – the 
EPP – as Orbán’s Fidesz party. What is more, he even 
decided to go into the elections together with a German 
opposition party, the liberal FDP. Campaigning openly 
against one’s closest international ally can be a delicate 
matter. Macron is using common declarations to disguise 
his disappointment with Germany’s reluctance to more 
energetically advance the European reforms. However, 
his frustration is emerging more and more often, as was 
evident after the weak compromise on the reform in sum-
mer 2018. The modest scope of the agreement, which was 
limited only to the broadest issues, was at least partially 
due to Germany’s hesitation on taxing technology giants 
– an important issue for Macron in the domestic political 
debate. In light of these tensions, substantial divisions 
during the next term of the European Parliament will aid 
neither Germany nor France.
Five months ahead of the vote, the prospects seem dim 
for LREM to enter the EP in a strong enough position for 
Macron to modify the European institutions. The domestic 
tensions around the yellow vests are likely to continue 
and to benefit extremist parties, notably the far-right RN. 
Recent polls alternately place LREM or RN at the top. Le 
Pen’s party could potentially repeat its success of the 2014 
European Parliamentary election and become the leading 
French party with around 24 percent.5 The yellow vests 
decided to present their own list for the polls, which will 
almost certainly send further shock waves through the 
elections: On the one hand, it might help Macron by win-
ning voters off the extremist parties; but on the other hand, 
it would send deputies with unclear political affiliations 
into the EP. Furthermore, the yellow vests’ representation 
in the Parliament would boost their domestic legitimacy, 
which could be detrimental for the president. Potential 
European allies are reserved in announcing coalitions and 
reluctant to join the discourse on a gap between populists 
and progressives. Without a strong result, Macron will 
face difficulties to entice the Greens, Socialists or Conser-
vatives away from their respective groups into a new one. 
Unlike 2017, when LREM was catapulted onto the political 
center stage, now, the other national parties in France are 
not as weak as they had been at the time. 
Macron’s capacity to reshape or even fragment the 
European party families is weak, making a repetition of 
the success of 2017 at European level improbable. The 
rejection of nationalist or anti-European movements and 
their attitudes is not sufficient for creating new dynamics 
beyond the existing left-right-divide. The national situ-
ation which gave rise to the president’s movement is too 
complex to be expanded and applied to the transnational 
context, and gaining traction at European level is proving 
to be no easy feat for Macron’s enterprise.
Matteo Salvini: The Far-Right Strongman 
Keen to Join Forces 
Matteo Salvini, Italy’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minis-
ter of the Interior, is currently the strongest far-right euro-
skeptic leader in the EU. Encouraged by his meteoric rise 
to power in Italy, he is seeking to take his national success 
to the European level. His declared aim is to create a 
pan-European network of other like-minded nationalist 
parties to repatriate major EU powers from Brussels back 
to national capitals and to establish an anti-migrant “Eu-
rope of the fatherlands”. Although previous attempts by 
populist right-wing parties to form a euroskeptic alliance 
in the European Parliament have not been very successful, 
Salvini’s radiance and his ability to unite should not be 
underestimated.
Like the Rassemblement National (RN) in France and 
other far-right parties, Salvini’s League (Lega) has moved 
away from its most extreme anti-European positions, in-
cluding the demand for a referendum on EU membership 
and a rapid withdrawal from the euro. Instead, Salvini 
is now attempting to change the EU from within by 
becoming one of its key leaders. His outspoken purpose 
is to reverse the history of European integration and to 
 . Position: Deputy Prime Minister and  
Minister of Interior of Italy
 . Age: 45 
 . Country population: 60 million 
 . Party affiliation at the EP, possible no. of MEPs: 
Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF),  
30-35 out of ca. 110-170
 . Declared Ambition: Form a united euroskeptic 
club as the largest faction in the new EP
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transform the Union from an organization that allegedly 
serves the interests of bankers, financiers, lobbyists, bu-
reaucrats, and multinationals into one that represents the 
“real people” of Europe. In order to save an EU ostensibly 
on the verge of collapse, he is promoting a new European 
community with closed external borders, based on na-
tional sovereignty and traditional European values. 
A Poor Man’s Lawyer to Save Italy – and Europe
Matteo Salvini is projecting himself as a poor man’s 
lawyer fighting against the establishment. He contends 
to speak for those who “are waking up to populism and 
nationalism”6 both in Italy and Europe, and hopes to 
win their support for his political goals. Just before the 
general election in Italy in early 2018, he told the Euro-
pean Parliament: “If you are afraid of the free vote of the 
citizens, it means that this European Union is a sinking 
Titanic. We will do our utmost – either Europe changes, or 
the people will change it, starting on 4 March in Italy.”7 
Less than a year later, he has already successfully com-
pleted the first stage of his political mission: Compared 
to the 2013 Italian general election when the League won 
a mere 4.1 percent of the votes, Salvini managed to more 
than quadruple its share in 2018. The League has clearly 
emerged as the strongest force in the center-right alliance 
with over 17 percent of the votes, overtaking Silvio Ber-
lusconi’s Forza Italia. The League and its coalition partner, 
the Five Star Movement (M5S), have become the biggest 
winner, and triggered a political revolution in Italy that 
has swept aside the established parties from both left and 
right, creating space for an alliance of political extremes. 
This phenomenon has made the current government in 
Rome the most euroskeptic in Italian history. 
Meanwhile, the balance of power within the coalition 
has shifted. Since entering the government as the junior 
partner in May 2018, the League has virtually doubled its 
poll ratings and surpassed the M5S. Mere months away 
from the European elections, the League currently sees its 
support up at 33.7 percent, while M5S has suffered a drop 
to 24.8 percent.8 Without doubt, the far-right League is 
now Italy’s strongest political force, not only in the north 
of the country where it originated, but also in the south. 
Salvini is the most popular politician in the coalition and 
most Italians view him as the de facto head of govern-
ment. He has a massive presence on social media, radio, 
and television, and dominates the sphere of public debate.
Salvini’s Anti-EU-Rhetoric Strikes a Chord 
Like no other Italian politician, Salvini seems to have 
grasped the magnitude of discontent in Italy, and the 
popular anger directed at “Brussels” as well as the Italian 
political establishment. He has successfully channeled it 
into support for himself and his party: According to the 
last Eurobarometer survey from November 2018, Italy is 
among the states with the largest share of respondents 
who have a negative image of the EU.9
Encouraged and inspired by his extraordinary domes-
tic triumph, Salvini is now eager to duplicate it in the up-
coming European elections. To do so, he is employing the 
same strategy that helped him win in Italy, adapted to the 
European level. He draws on open hostility to “Brussels” 
and the EU institutions. At times, he directs it specifically 
at German austerity and migration policies which he 
holds responsible for Italy’s poor economic performance 
and for turning his country into “the refugee camp of 
Europe.”10 It is not a coincidence that a battle has erupted 
with the EU Commission over the Italian budget proposal, 
or that Salvini have been showcasing his hardline stance 
on immigration at every single EU interior ministers’ 
meeting since taking office: By “resisting” the EU, he is 
signaling to Italian voters that he puts them first – true to 
his slogan “Prima gli Italiani” (“Italians First”). Talking 
to the townspeople of Ivrea in June 2018, he summarized 
his approach to the EU in one sentence: “If you raise 
your head and say ‘Stop, we are Italy, we’re tired of being 
treated like the last piece of filth’, the others are forced to 
listen to you.”11
This growing euroskepticism directly stems from the 
global economic and financial crisis in 2008, which dealt 
a particularly heavy blow to Italy from which the country 
is still reeling.12 In addition, many Italians felt abandoned 
by the northern Europeans when faced with a steep rise 
in refugee numbers arriving across the Mediterranean. 
In their view, the northern Europeans have been hiding 
behind the Dublin Regulation for far too long. Many Ital-
ians believe that the country has long reached the limit of 
its absorption capacity, and they have been accusing the 
other EU member states of not doing enough to help Italy 
in this difficult situation. The distribution mechanism 
adopted by the EU has proved to be a disastrous failure. 
Alongside the dire economic situation, this is the main 
cause of growing frustration with the EU which, hit by 
high youth unemployment in Italy, is particularly preva-
lent among the young.
With his tirades against the EU, his xenophobic posi-
tions, arch-conservative values, and his opposition to 
the “diktats from Brussels”, Salvini continues to steadily 
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fuel Italian euroskepticism. Consequently, Italy – which 
will become the third-largest economy of the eurozone 
following the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the 
EU – is transitioning with alarming speed from one of the 
most europhile countries in the EU to one with the lowest 
support for it. 
This is a serious threat to the future of the EU. A 
government that aims to confront the EU’s institutions in 
order to win the hearts and minds of the Italian popu-
lation is a loose cannon for the fate of the European 
integration project. Italy’s potential for disruption cannot 
be understated: If the Italian government fails to navigate 
the looming financial crisis in the country, the implica-
tions for the eurozone would dwarf the Greek debt crisis, 
and likely be its deathblow. Ultimately, it could also lead 
to Italy’s exit from the EU. Italy is simply too big to fail: 
Its demise would inexorably lead to the ruin of the entire 
system. In that sense, Salvini can hold the euro hostage 
when dealing with the European Commission and the 
other heads of state and government. He can leverage 
Italy’s size and financial weight to suggest a credible eco-
nomic murder-suicide pact.
A Bond to Change Europe
So far, Salvini’s gamble has proven worthwhile. Not only 
do more than 60 percent of Italians support his populist 
coalition government. Salvini is also seen as a strongman 
by his fellow far-right nationalist leaders across Europe. 
Yet, in order to reach his goal of fundamentally trans-
forming the EU, he needs allies. He seeks to rally them 
into a unified right-wing alliance, a “Lega delle Leghe” or 
“League of the Leagues”, to create a pan-European net-
work of nationalist parties who work together to remodel 
the EU. His allies in building his Nationalist International 
already include Salvini’s long-time friend and French 
far-right leader Marine Le Pen, Geert Wilders of the Dutch 
Party for Freedom, and Harald Vilimsky of the Freedom 
Party of Austria. Jörg Meuthen, Alternative for Germany’s 
party leader, has also pledged his support for the project. 
Salvini’s closest partner in the EU, however, is un-
doubtedly Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who 
has praised Salvini as his “personal hero” and “compan-
ion of destiny.” On multiple occasions in recent years, 
Salvini has likewise expressed his admiration for Orbán’s 
European political visions and called his refugee policy 
“exemplary”. During a discussion about the situation in 
Hungary in the European Parliament on 26 April, 2017, 
Salvini expressed his strong support for Orbán by thank-
ing him for his policies and for “resisting the diktats of the 
European Soviet Union”.13
However, so far, attempts to bundle together the right-
wing euroskeptic forces in the European Parliament have 
failed due to differing views in key policy areas. That 
said, no politician has ever taken on this challenge with 
Salvini’s dedication, systematic approach and political 
strength. His ability to unite is unquestionable: Over the 
course of just five years, he has successfully transformed 
the former Northern League, a party aimed at separating 
northern Italy from the “parasitic south”, into a national 
party garnering support from the country’s center and 
south. Despite their vastly different political outlooks, he 
has found enough common ground with M5S – a party 
which has gathered significant backing from disgruntled 
left-wing voters – to form an unlikely government coali-
tion. Matteo Salvini’s remarkable feat has been to focus 
attention on unifying issues rather than divisive ones.
This became clear again during Salvini’s visit to War-
saw on 9 January 2019: Following talks with the leader 
of Poland’s ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party Jarosław 
Kaczyński, he declared his ambition to form an Italian-
Polish axis of ruling populist parties to save Christian 
Europe and to counterbalance the Franco-German axis 
of EU mainstream political parties. At least publicly, the 
Polish side has so far shown itself less committed, as this 
course might run against PiS’s domestic strategy to win 
pro-EU centrist voters in the crucial national parliamen-
tary elections in October 2019. It is very likely that PiS 
will only decide about its party affiliation in the EP after 
the Polish elections. 
Thus, in spite of all grand declarations and pledges, 
the decisive factor are negotiations on future party af-
filiations which can only take place after the European 
elections, and which depend on the actual results and 
potential combinations for forming new parliamentary 
groups. A strong result for Salvini’s League in the Euro-
pean elections – which could even trigger an election 
at home catapulting Salvini into the prime minister’s 
seat – would make him a natural focal point and a very 
attractive partner for a united alliance in the EU. In prac-
tice, however, uniting nationalist and far-right parties 
in the same political family will remain an uphill battle. 
Foreshadowing the challenges ahead, the authors of this 
study learned on a recent research trip to Warsaw that 
Kaczyński had signaled to Salvini that the latter would 
have to choose between PiS and Le Pen, as Kaczyński did 
not wish to be in the same political family as her, due to 
RN’s strong ties to Russia.
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Viktor Orbán –  
The Cunning Veteran Pondering All Options
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has also defined 
the upcoming European Parliament election as a turning-
point in European politics. As a champion of the EU’s 
anti-migration camp, he is eager to retain migration as the 
central issue in what is the first Europe-wide vote since the 
2015 migration crisis. While preferring to remain within 
the center-right European People’s Party (EPP), Orbán is 
also coordinating with Salvini and others in the EU-skep-
tic camp for the longer term. Orbán has even managed to 
retain a communication channel to most populist parties – 
despite the fact that some of them, such as the RN and PiS, 
are not on speaking terms with each other. 
Publicly, he has been calling on anti-migration parties 
to win a majority in the new European Parliament. In actu-
al terms, however, he is preparing the ground for informal 
minority coalitions across political groups that would be 
strong enough to block unfavorable legislations. Continu-
ous polarization over migration is also a tactical tool: It 
allows him to expand his influence on EU-wide campaigns 
beyond Hungary – a small EU country compared to France 
or Italy –, and to increase his leverage in the negotiations 
on future party affiliations after the election.
In several interviews last year, Hungary’s prime min-
ister reminded his audience that Europe was on the verge 
of a new era. In his weekly radio address in September 
2018, for instance, he claimed that “there has never been 
a more important European Parliament, and it’s possible 
that there will not be another one like it in our lifetime.”14
Early on, Orbán had identified an opportunity for a 
new era in European politics with a weakened position for 
“liberals”, a label he applies negatively to broad centrist 
forces on the political left and right that favor an open 
Europe based on tolerance, liberal democracy and rule of 
law. In populist terms, he claims that the EU mainstream, 
which includes current Christian Democratic leaders of 
Germany and other large Western European countries, 
has been experimenting with the concept of a “mixed 
civilization”. He also proclaims that “Christian Europe 
should not be turned into Christian-Muslim Europe”. 
The Overarching Question:  
How Will the Two Groups Cooperate? 
Orbán’s declared assumption is that anti-migration, 
nationalist and euroskeptic political forces will have a 
stronger position in the new European Parliament and 
change the political wind in Europe. As he stated in a 
further interview in October 2018: “If we succeed in elect-
ing and appointing MEPs and Commissioners who love 
their countries and are committed to their nations, then 
we will be able to launch an entirely new European policy 
program.”15
According to Orbán, the overarching question is how 
these two groups – mainstream and euroskeptics alias 
national populists – will be able to cooperate in the new 
European Parliament after May 2019. Moreover, even if 
euroskeptic parties do not unite into one group, they will 
have more political clout and underpin Orbán’s position 
and space for maneuver at EU level.  
At least three factors make Orbán’s actions highly rel-
evant. Firstly, the EPP – the largest block in the European 
Parliament – relies on Fidesz MEPs for support in the 
Parliament. Confident about his position, Orbán has also 
been cultivating ties with the euroskeptics and far-right 
parties at the same time. While wishing to remain within 
the EPP, Orbán has been unequivocal about his inten-
tion to shift the party to the right despite its leadership’s 
preference to stay in the political center. These dynam-
ics within the EPP will allow Orbán to play a potentially 
important role in the ongoing realignment of the EU party 
systems. Having said that, he is skating on thin ice as 
frustrations over Fidesz run high: In September 2018, the 
uneasy relationship between the party and EPP reached a 
boiling point when the majority of EPP members – includ-
ing group leader Manfred Weber – voted to launch a sanc-
tions procedure against Fidesz under the Article 7 of the 
Lisbon Treaty for breaching EU rules and values. 
Secondly, Orbán’s ideological appeal among the EU’s 
traditional conservatives and his long-running political 
experience strengthen his legitimacy among most center-
right MEPs. After Germany’s Angela Merkel, Viktor Orbán 
is the longest-serving head of government within the 
European Council. 
Thirdly, the landslide victory in Hungary’s parliamen-
tary elections in April 2018 has renewed the two-thirds 
majority of Fidesz and consolidated Orbán’s dominant 
position at home. However, Orbán’s government is 
frequently criticized for eroding democracy and for his 
authoritarian tendencies. In recent weeks, the Fidesz 
party’s hasty approval of controversial labor laws which 
 . Position: Prime Minister of Hungary
 . Age: 55
 . Country population: 10 million
 . Party affiliation at the EP, possible no. of MEPs: 
EPP, 15 out of ca. 180
 . Declared ambition: Majority for anti-migration 
forces and formation of “blocking coalitions”
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allowed increased overtime hours has prompted waves of 
large-scale public protests throughout Hungary. 
Punching above One’s Weight 
In this power struggle among the right, Hungary’s prime 
minister is well aware of the limited size of his country. 
At best, Fidesz can hope to secure some fifteen MEP seats, 
and co-opt two to three more from ethnic Hungarian 
minorities in neighboring countries. The main parties in 
the largest EU countries – Germany, France and Italy – 
are likely to gain almost twice as many. Orbán, therefore, 
knows that he must rely on alliances with like-minded 
Western European leaders. When he was asked in June 
2018 about Italian media reports on a Salvini-Orbán axis, 
he replied with a dose of realism: Aware of “the difference 
in our weight classes”, he stated that “flyweight should 
not be confused with heavyweight, otherwise you’ll find 
yourself flying out of the ring”.16
Nevertheless, he does appear to have high expecta-
tions from Salvini and other European populists – al-
though he was disappointed by Austrian Prime Minister 
Sebastian Kurz. Kurz has recently positioned himself as 
a more modern, acceptable and pro-European version of 
Orbán, and, in doing so, effectively became his competi-
tor within the EPP group. The Hungarian leader, on the 
other hand, has coordinated more closely with Salvini 
on the European elections. At a high-profile meeting in 
August 2018 in Milan, they claimed to be “walking down 
the same path” on Europe, pledged to form a common 
anti-migration front, and said they would oppose the EU 
policies of President Macron. 
Viktor Orbán reiterated this message at his unusual 
press conference on 10 January 2019, which was mostly 
devoted to the EP election. In spite of Macron’s reluctance 
to accept more asylum seekers from rescue ships in the 
Mediterranean, Hungary’s prime minister continues to re-
fer to Macron as the “leader of the pro-immigration forces” 
in Europe. At the same time, Orbán has praised Salvini’s 
talks in Warsaw and called an Italian-Polish initiative to 
form a euroskeptic alliance after the European Parlia-
ment election as “one of the greatest developments that 
this year could have started with”.17
In summary, Orbán plans to stay within the EPP and 
continues to play it both ways to increase his influence 
and enhance his tactical options for the future. His guid-
ing principle is to create a looser union of strong nation-
states to obtain a more favorable environment for Hun-
gary and his own government. 
Outlook on the European Parliamentary 
Election 2019
Macron, Salvini, and Orbán are widely perceived as 
having the potential to shake up their respective politi-
cal families and, with them, the balance of power in the 
European Parliament. However, this analysis shows that 
although Macron was perceived as the most powerful 
European politician for a time, support for him is losing 
momentum, and his attempts to polarize the campaign 
have so far mainly benefitted the populists.
Macron has failed to bring on board his own popula-
tion and his European partners in his mission to revolu-
tionize the European Parliament. By contrast, the disrup-
tive potential of Salvini and Orbán will prove significant, 
even if the balance of power in the EP remains tilted to-
ward pro-European forces. Salvini’s spoiler approach and 
Orbán’s “hybrid role” will have important consequences 
for future interactions between European institutions, 
the composition of the new European Commission, and 
perhaps also the assignment of top positions in the EU 
later this year. Below are six key take-aways for the poten-
tial of all three leaders to shape the European elections. 
Macron’s LREM Is out of Step with  
EU Party Politics
Emmanuel Macron and his party have set the tone for 
their campaign earlier than others in an effort to make 
the 2019 EP election a plebiscite on Europe. However, 
their attempt to frame the European elections as a battle 
between pro- and anti-European forces – between “pro-
gressives and nationalists” – has not borne fruit. In fact, it 
seems to have been counter-productive: Rallying pro-
Europeans around him has proved to be difficult due to 
unbridgeable gaps. Meanwhile, anti-Europeans can more 
easily ignore differences among themselves and cast the 
elections in terms of a referendum against Macron.  
Currently, the prospects for Macron’s movement to 
enter the EP as a strong force seem remote. Reluctant to 
adopt the progressive-versus-nationalist narrative, Ma-
cron’s potential European allies have so far fallen short of 
announcing coalitions with LREM. Contrary to the hope 
of LREM  members after Macron’s election, the pro-Euro-
pean movement has not spread to other European coun-
tries. An effective European-wide roll-out of Macron’s 
2017 strategy has failed, as – overwhelmed by domestic 
difficulties – Macron never actually implemented it. Pro-
grammatic differences are encumbering the alliance with 
ALDE, and a strong pro-European stance alone will not be 
enough to carry a whole campaign.
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Both Macron’s approval ratings and the current polling 
figures for LREM in regard to the European elections are 
poor, and a solid recovery seems distant. The domestic 
unrest caused by the often violent yellow vests protests 
is likely to continue and will probably benefit extremist 
parties, notably RN. The yellow vests’ move to enter the 
EP with a list of their own will reshuffle the status quo 
even further. It will most likely be to the detriment of Le 
Pen, but could equally harm Macron as the personified 
opposition to the president enters EU institutions with 
boosted legitimacy.
Polarizing Campaign Has Benefitted  
the Populists
Macron’s attempted polarization has, for the most part, 
played into the hands of the camp led by Salvini and 
Orbán, who have long framed their arguments through 
an “us-versus-them” lens. Reducing complex facts to 
simple opposites is a customary tool for populists. Doing 
so leaves them an upper hand in a polarized confronta-
tion, when in reality, most of Europe’s problems cannot be 
solved by simple measures. 
Therefore, those who wish to preserve European inte-
gration should focus their election campaigns on concrete 
issues rather than engaging in a we-against-them rheto-
ric. It will be crucial to champion the added value which 
European cooperation brings and to propose concrete, 
actionable solutions to problems that no European state 
can solve on its own. 
Right-Wing Euroskeptics Have Different Priorities 
With their combative anti-EU statements, Salvini and 
Orbán have so far brushed aside existing policy differ-
ences between their parties. In actual fact, however, they 
are deeply divided on issues of migration and economic 
policies, and cooperation could prove to be very difficult. 
The fault lines between Salvini and Orbán are exemplary 
for the strong tensions that exist within Europe’s entire 
right-wing camp. Often fraught with conflicts over priori-
ties and interests, and with little appetite for compromise, 
previous attempts by populist right-wing parties to form a 
euroskeptic alliance in the European Parliament have not 
been very successful. 
As interior minister, Salvini has pushed for the distri-
bution among EU member states of asylum seekers and 
migrants who come to Italy, whereas Orbán has stood 
with other Central Europeans of the Visegrád Group in 
refusing any relocation. Italy and Hungary also belong to 
different camps in the looming battle over the EU’s Mul-
tiannual Financial Framework for the 2021-2027 period. 
Budapest stands to lose from proposed cuts to the EU 
Cohesion Fund, while Italy – the most exposed EU border 
country besides Greece and Spain – can expect more 
financial help within the framework of a redesigned EU 
migration policy.
Orbán, together with other Central Europeans, is also 
suspicious of Macron’s “Social Europe” agenda. He has 
dismissed it as merely another form of protectionism and 
is eager to further liberalize the European single market. 
Salvini, on the other hand, questions the strict rules of the 
Stability and Growth Pact, and advocates a flexible budget 
to promote growth and employment. Another dividing 
factor is foreign policy, most notably relations with Russia. 
In this regard, Kaczyński’s skepticism about Salvini’s (and 
Le Pen’s) friendly approach to Russian President Vladimir 
Putin is also an impediment to closer collaboration. 
Salvini’s Leadership and Anti-Migration Sentiments 
Are Unifying Factors
However, two factors might facilitate a broad right-wing 
euroskeptic alliance at this time. Firstly, none of the ear-
lier efforts have seen a level of commitment that matches 
Salvini’s, nor his systematic approach and political 
strength. The fact that he has managed to both make the 
League attractive for people in southern Italy and build 
a coalition with M5S showcases that his strength lies in 
focusing attention on issues that unite rather than divide. 
Secondly, all former attempts by the populist right-
wing parties to form a euroskeptic alliance in the Euro-
pean Parliament happened before the 2015 migration 
crisis. Even though the total number of arrivals in the EU 
has since decreased, migration continues to play a crucial 
role in national debates and is boosting the political right 
in the polls. Although the camps are divided on the issue 
of relocation, their fierce anti-migration stance is a strong 
unifying factor which could lead to at least an informal 
coalition. All populist right-wing parties now advocate 
the notion of a “Fortress Europe”.
Orbán Aims to Tip the Scales by means of 
“Blocking Coalitions”
Orbán, meanwhile, has so far stopped short of assisting 
Salvini in the creation of a larger euroskeptic bloc by 
leaving the EPP. In fact, he prefers to stay in the EPP for as 
long as possible – certainly as long as it remains Brussels’ 
power-house that could protect Fidesz and advance Hun-
gary’s interests. At the same time, however, he will likely 
continue to coordinate with Salvini and others to increase 
his influence across the party blocks. Rather than disrupt 
the new European Parliament, the Hungarian prime 
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minister appears keen to capitalize on its increased frag-
mentation and on the stronger role of anti-EU populist 
forces. The optimal result for the Hungarian leader would 
be a very narrow functional majority in the new EP as 
this would provide him with additional leverage over the 
EPP. If the existing power balance in the European Parlia-
ment changes, new constellations of political forces could 
develop across traditional party divides, based more on 
ad-hoc coalitions. This would increase Orbán’s space for 
maneuver. His aim is not to promote particular policy 
agendas or to establish coalitions behind them. Looking 
beyond 2019, he rather appears eager to shape “blocking 
minorities” to safeguard national sovereignty and shield 
rule-breaking populist leaders within the EU from puni-
tive actions by EU institutions. 
Next Targets: The European Commission and the 
Multiannual Financial Framework
Enhanced influence and coordination among anti-EU 
populist MEPs will have significant consequences for the 
interaction between the EU institutions. Although they 
will not have the absolute majority necessary to reject 
or amend the Council’s positions, they could influence 
forming such majorities or block crucial decisions. A more 
divided, politically fragmented Parliament will be less 
likely to pass EU laws and ambitious reforms, nor will it 
be able to remain an engine of the EU integration process. 
Internal battles in the new EP will consume consider-
able time and political energies. An early test will be the 
election of the next President of the European Commis-
sion. Much depends on other pro-EU parties which are 
still likely to hold the majority in the EP and be under 
pressure to join forces. The new EU Commission with 
nominees from Salvini’s, Orbán’s and other populist 
governments will also be noticeably less cohesive in a 
political sense. 
A major political clash is likely to focus on the new 
EU budget for the period 2021 to 2027. The Multiannual 
Financial Framework proposed by the current Commis-
sion is already being negotiated among the governments. 
It will lead up to a unanimous decision by the European 
Council, followed by a negotiation among the Council, 
Commission and Parliament with a final vote in the 
latter. The original ambition was to have an agreement 
before May 2019, yet this proved unrealistic. There is 
a hard deadline as the current EU financial framework 
expires in 2020. 
The inter-institutional negotiations will be more com-
plex and difficult than before. The stakes are much higher 
this time, which could result in longer delays and block-
ages than usual. Furthermore, divisive debates among 
EU leaders about how the EU should spend its funds will 
benefit populists and nationalists in the new EP. For some, 
inflicting reputational damage on the EU and putting the 
launch of key EU financial programs at risk will be a goal 
in itself. However, it would also come at a considerable 
cost to member states and their governments, including 
those of Salvini and Orbán, who are more incentivized to 
play a pragmatic role than euroskeptic leaders who are 
currently not in power. 
Nevertheless, if the Brussels system significantly slows 
down or becomes dysfunctional, some national govern-
ments might start by-passing the European Parliament by 
striking intergovernmental deals to safeguard EU policies 
and the main achievements of EU integration. This would 
pave the way to a remarkably more differentiated Euro-
pean Union than we have seen in the past decades. 
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